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Office Memorandum • UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT

TO : Chief, ICAPS, ATTN: Col. Halversen DATE: 15 September 1947


FROM : Assistant Director, Collection & Dissemination

SUBJECT: First Revision of SWNCC Subcommittee Special Studies and Evaluation
(Psychological Warfare Committee) SSEI dated 1 Aug. 1947

ENCLOSURES: All papers submitted to this office re subject.

1. The enclosed papers are returned herewith, having been examined by this office as requested in your memorandum of 12 September 1947. OCD has no pertinent comment to make relative the papers, and expresses general concurrence therein.

2. If and when the organization recommended is established, OCD will be available to ascertain its requirements for CIG intelligence, and to provide them with same.


C. E. OLSEN
Captain, U. S. N.
Assistant Director for
Collection and Dissemination

NSC review(s) completed.

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16 September 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF, ICAPS

SUBJECT: Comments on SWNC Sub-committee Special Studies
and Evaluations.

1. Reference Para. 13 (... "no appreciable advantage was taken of lessons learned in World War II"), suggest that there be included among the conclusions in Para. 32 a sub-paragraph providing for a temporary advisory committee. This committee should consist of the former chiefs, experts, and key personnel of the various U.S. agencies concerned with psychological warfare during World War II. It should be responsible for a detailed analysis of the deficiencies in planning and coordination in psychological warfare from 1941-1945, and with the formulation of concrete recommendations to prevent the same mistakes from being repeated by the new agency. Only those who have had actual operating experience in psychological warfare can be cognizant of the problems which it involves.

2. Reference "Note by the Chairman," Para. 2b, suggest that careful study be given to a precise definition of "black" propaganda and to a general delimitation between the field of psychological warfare, and the spheres of intelligence, counter-intelligence, sabotage, conspiracy, and subversion. Experience during World War II has shown the confusion and actual compromise of U.S. plans and aims which can result from two U.S. organizations engaging in conspiratorial operations in one area. Psychological warfare and propaganda should not be interpreted to include actual subversive operations in foreign territory.

3. It is suggested that instead of establishing a new organization to handle psychological warfare, which is bound to meet opposition from an economy-minded Congress, consideration be given to the establishment of a committee under the National Security Council which in turn would delegate to existing organizations the responsibility for planning and undertaking psychological warfare activities.

It is also worthy of note that the creation of a special Psychological Warfare Organization would draw attention to its activities, thus endangering the security of any subversive activities it may undertake.

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Deputy Assistant Director
Office of Operations